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Abstract—To accommodate the ever-growing traffic load and
bandwidth demand generated by mobile users, Mobile Network
Operators (MNOs) need to frequently invest in high spectral effi-
ciency technologies and increase their hold of spectrum resources;
MNOs have then to weigh between building individual networks
or entering into network and spectrum sharing agreements.
We address here the problem of Radio Access Network (RAN)
and spectrum sharing in 4G mobile networks by focusing on
a case when multiple MNOs plan to deploy small cell Base
Stations in a geographical area in order to upgrade their existing
network infrastructure. We propose two cooperative game models
(with and without transferable utility) to address the proposed
problem: for given network (user throughput, MNO market
and spectrum shares) and economic (coalition cost, mobile data
pricing model) settings, the proposed models output a cost
division policy that guarantees coalition (sharing agreement)
stability.
Index Terms—RAN sharing, spectrum sharing, 4G, cooper-
ative games, transferable utility, non-transferable utility, core,
nucleolus.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE mobile network ecosystem is intrinsically compet-itive as Mobile Network Operators (MNOs) are self-
interested entities. However, expensive technology upgrades
to support user demand [1], revenues decline [2], regulators
intervention [3] and communities health/environmental con-
cerns are pushing competing operators to cooperate and share
their networks. Nevertheless, cost reduction remains the main
driver for network sharing: The mobile market is characterized
by high upfront cost for acquiring spectrum licenses and
deploying and operating the network infrastructure, which
is particularly heavy on new-entrants [3]. Nowadays, MNOs
need to invest in high spectral efficiency mobile technologies
such as LTE-A and 5G and, in particular, to increase their
hold of spectrum resources in order to accommodate the
exponentially growing demand for mobile data services [1].
To the high upgrade upfront cost amounts the decrease in
revenues, strongly due to Over The Top (OTT) applications
replacing MNOs main revenue resources such as voice and
SMS [4]: but as investment in new technologies becomes little
profitable, innovation is held back.
Network sharing agreements for greenfield network roll-outs
have become a means to reduce the high upfront infrastructure
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cost and, when spectrum sharing is allowed1, to boost the
network capacity by aggregating spectrum resources.
Network sharing can encompass different parts of the net-
work architecture in addition to having different geographical
footprints [8,9]. Passive sharing (site and mast sharing), the
most commonplace sharing alternative, is either mandated (or
strongly encouraged) by regulators or voluntary adopted given
the limited site availability, urban planning constraints and
communities aesthetics and health concerns [9]–[11]. Up to
date, several 50:50 joint ventures for 3G/4G greenfield network
deployments have been created; while most concern only
sharing of the Radio Access Network (RAN) infrastructure,
in some cases, also spectrum is shared [6,11].
We address here the common spectrum network sharing sce-
nario, as defined in the Third Generation Partnership Project
(3GPP) specifications for network sharing [12]. Namely, we
assume multiple MNOs offer their services through a single
(shared) RAN while running individual core networks; “MNOs
share the total spectrum obtained from pooling together their
respective allocated spectrum portions while it is also possible
for MNOs with no allocated spectrum to use the pooled
spectrum" [12]. One viable option for implementing such
scenario in 4G networks is Carrier Aggregation (CA), an LTE-
A standardized feature [13] that enables pooling together the
spectrum allocated in different bands2.
In this work, we consider a set of MNOs with fixed market
shares and individual spectrum licenses, which plan to upgrade
their RAN by deploying small cell Base Stations (BSs) in
order to improve the service provided to their users and thus
increase their revenues. MNOs decide whether to upgrade their
RAN by themselves or enter into a sharing agreement with
other MNOs. If a set (all) of MNOs enters into a sharing
agreement, that is, a coalition is created, we assume it will
make use of all the aggregated spectrum resources of its
members. We propose two cooperative game theory models,
with and without transferable utility, to determine stable cost
divisions for coalitions of MNOs entering sharing agreements.
The proposed models are then leveraged to investigate several
network (user throughput, market and spectrum shares) and
1In practice, both infrastructure and spectrum sharing viability are subject
to national and regional/international regulation. Sharing and/or transferring
of licensed spectrum is prohibited in most countries [5]. There are however
examples of spectrum sharing: for instance, in Sweden, operator Tele2 is into
a 3G license and network sharing agreement with TeliaSonora and it has
entered a similar agreement for deploying a 4G network with Telenor [6],
[7].
2116 operators have commercially launched LTE-A with CA [14]. CA will
most likely be an enabler also for future generation networks given the 5G
throughput targets.
2economic configurations (coalition cost, mobile data pricing
model) which aim to represent realistic scenarios.
The main findings of this work are the following:
• If all MNOs contribute with spectrum resources, they
prefer building a unique shared RAN due to the combined
gain of spectrum aggregation and the cost reduction from
sharing the network infrastructure; formally, this means
that the reference cooperative game has a nonempty
core, which makes the grand coalition preferable to any
subcoalition.
• The stable division (among MNOs) of the shared network
infrastructure cost depends on both network and eco-
nomic settings: MNOs with a larger customer base should
be accounted for a larger fraction of the network cost;
instead, MNOs which contribute with a larger spectrum
portion are “rewarded” by a lower cost fraction and,
in some cases, not only they are exempted from such
cost but also receive part of the other MNO individual
revenues, which suggests a way to compensate them
from most likely higher cost incurred when acquiring the
spectrum license3.
• A trivial cost division based on the market share does not
always guarantee stability; instead, the stable cost division
selected by the nucleolus, which accounts also for the
MNOs spectrum contribute, makes a better candidate for
a cost division policy.
The manuscript is organized as follows: The literature
review is presented in Section II. In Section III, we state the
problem and define the coalitions cost and the proposed pricing
model. The Transferable Utility (TU) and Non-Transferable
Utility (NTU) cooperative models are introduced in Sec-
tion IV. The simulation environment and the problem instances
are described in Section V. Results obtained with the two
cooperative models are analyzed in Section VI. In Section VII,
we discuss some of the assumptions made and the applicability
of the proposed models. Our concluding remarks are drawn in
Section VIII.
II. RELATED WORK
Recent works on resource sharing deal mainly with opera-
tional aspects, such as scheduling of shared resources among
multiple operators. [15] adopts the Generalized Processor
Sharing principle to a multi-operator scheduler when operators
agree a priori on their respective resource shares. In the same
lines, [16] investigates the trade-off between fairness, that
is, satisfying operators predefined resource shares and the
achievable spectral efficiency by deviating from predefined
resource shares. [17] introduces the SoftRAN architecture,
which extends the concept of Software Defined Networks
(SDN) to the RAN. A centralized scheduler for SoftRAN is
proposed in [18]: the traffic of multiple operators is allocated
over the 3D (time-frequency-space) resource grid with the
objective of maximizing the total network utility. [19] proposes
3However, we do not account for the spectrum license cost here. Moreover,
the spectrum license cost does not depend only on the amount of bandwidth
associated with the license but also on the spectrum band and and the time
and place of the spectrum auction.
a 2-level radio resource scheduling (among MNOs, and for
each MNO among its user flows) BS virtualization scheme.
Given the competitive and cooperative nature of resource
sharing problems, many works resort to game theory: In
[20], the problem of resource allocation in a shared network
is formalized in two steps: the resource sharing among the
operators, and the resource bargaining among the users and
Mobile Virtual Network Operators of each operator. [21] in-
vestigates the sharing of different wireless access technologies.
In particular, [22]–[25] tackle spectrum sharing problems.
[22] models spectrum sharing among strategic operators in
unlicensed bands as a noncooperative game. Instead, [23]–
[25] deal with licensed spectrum. [25] also proposes a non-
cooperative game but takes the user perspective: assuming
MNOs with individual spectrum resources aggregate their
RANs, each user then independently selects its serving BS
from the shared pool in order to maximize its individual
data rate. [23] extends the concept of CA for limited-time
sharing of excess spectrum among MNOs that own exclusive
spectrum resources. Spectrum scheduling is carried out based
on the Nash Bargaining Solution concept while a distributed
algorithm is proposed for Bayesian coalition formation when
the MNO decisions are made based on incomplete information.
In [24], the inter-operator CA does not apply only to the
MNOs’ unutilized spectrum but, if profitable, MNOs can agree
to share a portion of their individual spectrum between their
own users and users of another MNO; the level of interference
caused by the latter is controlled by means of a pricing
mechanism. Such sharing scheme is limited only to two MNOs
and the pairing of a set of MNOs for mutually sharing part of
their spectrum is modeled as a stable roommate market.
As virtualization and SDN are expected to extend to wire-
less networks ([26], [27]), new architectures are anticipated
([18], [28], [29]). [28] and [29] envisage a “Network without
Borders", as the pool of virtualized wireless resources which
defies the current vertically-integrated mobile networks value-
chain by introducing new players such as service/infrastructure
providers and virtual operators. Inter-operator sharing is ar-
gued to be one of the key ingredients of such architecture.
The idea is further elaborated in [29], where the focus is on
novel spectrum management aspects.
Our work instead belongs to a complementary research
branch, whose focus is on the strategic modeling of infras-
tructure and spectrum sharing. In particular, we consider the
sharing of exclusive (licensed) MNO spectrum4.
On mid-to-long term joint decision making in the context of
cellular network planning, [31] introduces a competition-aware
network sharing framework which offers a trade-off between
the cost benefit of sharing and the incentive for investing in
next-generation technologies. While we address a greenfield-
deployment of small cell BSs, [31] assumes operators will pool
together their existing macro-cell RAN networks and make
joint decisions on future changes to their aggregated RAN such
as decommissioning, upgrading or adding new sites. Also in
[32], a recent work by Kibilda et al., the shared network is
4The literature on dynamic spectrum access, cognitive/software radio etc.
dealing with sharing of licensed and unlicensed spectrum [30] is not addressed
here.
3created by pooling together the operators’ individual network
infrastructure and/or their respective licensed spectrum. This
work compares the gains from infrastructure and spectrum
sharing when adopted separately and combined (full sharing)
on the basis of classical performance indicators such as
throughput and coverage probability obtained by means of
stochastic geometry models; such gains are shown to strongly
depend on the spatial correlation of the individual network
deployments and densities while infrastructure and spectrum
sharing gains do not sum up as full sharing introduces a trade-
off between data rate and coverage.
However, [33]–[35] are the only works which bear explicit
similarities with ours: they also tackle the strategic problem
of coalition formation in the context of infrastructure and
spectrum sharing and consider MNOs with fixed market shares
and pre-allocated spectrum; nevertheless, these works resort
to non-cooperative game theory. Moreover, players (MNOs)
payoffs are expressed only in terms of network cost estimates
and the coalition cost are split either uniformly among its
members [33,34] or according to the Shapley value [35].
Instead, we propose more refined payoff models for the MNOs
which accounts for both the MNO revenue (as a function of
the average user rate perceived by users) and cost. Moreover,
in the cooperative games proposed here the coalition cost is
not divided a priori among member operators; albeit the way
such cost is split determines the coalition stability.
In our previous work [36], we propose a Mixed Integer
Linear Programming model to address an infrastructure shar-
ing problem from a centralized/regulatory entity perspective.
Instead, in this work and in [37], we take the perspective of
the MNOs, which are self-interested entities, and thus resort to
game theory models. Further, in [37] we tackle the problem of
spectrum and infrastructure sharing addressed here by a non-
cooperative approach and formalize it as a generalized Nash
equilibrium problem, where the operators strategies consist of
the choice of coalition and the fraction of coalition cost to
pay. However, the non-cooperative approach limits the stability
analysis to the action of the single player, while the cooperative
approach allows to determine whether a coalition is stable or
not also in terms of joint actions of its members.
III. THE PROBLEM
A. Problem definition
We consider a set O of MNOs which provide data services
to users of a dense urban area through pre-4G macrocell
networks but have plans to upgrade their RAN technology
by deploying 4G small cells. We assume MNOs inherit the
user share from their individual current networks: being N
the number of users that populates the given area, each MNO
i ∈ O has a fixed market share σi , that is, user churning is
assumed to be null. We also assume that at least one MNO
owns a spectrum license of bi units of bandwidth5 which it
plans to put to use for the network of small cells. Each MNO
may decide to deploy its individual network of small cells or
collaborate with other MNOs to deploy a shared one. When a
5MNOs with no spectrum license are represented by bi = 0.
set of MNOs decides to deploy a shared network, we assume
they will agree on aggregating their individual spectrum. Let S
be the set of all possible coalitions that can be created, that is,
the set of all the possible subsets of MNOs agreeing to deploy
a shared network. If coalition s ∈ S is created, it will deploy
a shared network infrastructure of total cost c˜s which has to
be divided among its member MNOs. Applying a simple data
pricing model, each MNO i incurs revenues r˜ is from its user
subscriptions when in s. The case when MNOs in s agree to
share the coalition cost c˜s but keep their individual revenues
r˜ is is formalized as a cooperative game without transferable
payoffs. Alternatively, the case when MNOs would be willing
to give away also part of their revenues is modeled as a
cooperative game with transferable payoffs. The core and
nucleolus solution concepts are then leveraged to determine
stable cost divisions.
B. Cost and revenues definition
Since this work addresses sharing at the RAN, the adopted
cost model accounts only for radio equipments cost and a
simplified leased line pricing model for the backhaul trans-
mission cost as in [38]. Moreover, in [39], it is argued that
the cost associated with the RAN dominates the remaining
cellular network cost.
An investment period of duration D (months) has been
considered. Let gs be the total cost incurred in D by coalition
s from activating and operating one small cell BS: gs accounts
for the capital (CAPEX) and operational (OPEX) expenditures
of the radio equipment, the backhaul transmission cost and the
site build-out cost. We denote by b˜s the aggregated spectrum
of coalition s, that is, b˜s =
∑
i∈s bi , whereas by βs the
number of MNOs in s which own a spectrum license, that
is, βs = |{i ∈ s : bi > 0}|. Let gc,rsmall be the radio equipment
CAPEX of a typical small cell BS supporting a single carrier.
Given that a small cell BS activated by coalition s aggregates
βs carriers, it has to support βs − 1 additional carriers. As
in [40], we consider a fixed cost for each additional carrier,
calculated as a percentage φ of the cost gc,rmacro of a single-
carrier macrocell BS. The total radio equipment CAPEX of a
small cell BS activated by coalition s, gc,rs , is then given as
follows:
gc,rs = g
c,r
small + (βs − 1)φgc,rmacro. (1)
The Operations and Maintenance (O&M) annual cost of the
radio equipment is calculated as a percentage ξ of the cor-
responding total radio CAPEX gc,rs [38,41]. The considered
backhaul leased line pricing model consists of an upfront fee
gc,b and the annual leasing cost go,bs which are incurred for
each BS activated by coalition s. We assume that, in the
worst case, go,bs is proportional to the total amount of spectrum
(bandwidth) aggregated by any of the BSs of coalition s (b˜s).
Let go,b0 be the annual leased line cost for a reference carrier
of b0 units of bandwidth. We then set g
o,b
s equal to b˜s g
o,b
0 /b0.
Let gc,s denote the site build-out cost. Finally, the total cost
4gs incurred by coalition s from a single small cell BS in D is
given by:
gs = g
c,r
s + g
c,b + gc,s +
D
12
(
ξgc,rs + g
o,b
s
)
. (2)
The considered cost parameter values (Table I) refer to
HSPA technology as in [38,40], given that, to the best of our
knowledge, CA-enabled equipment cost are not made publicly
available by any vendor. Such cost should nevertheless repre-
sent a good estimate, at least in orders of magnitude, since
as argued by Johansson et al. [40], the physical infrastructure
cost of new radio access technologies tend to be similar to the
previous ones.
Symbol Description Value
gc,rsmall Single-carrier small cell BS radio equipment cost 3000e [38]
gc,rmacro Single-carrier macro cell BS radio equipment cost 20000e [38]
φ Cost coefficient per additional carrier 0.017 [40]
gc,b Upfront fee for backhaul 2000e [38]
b0 Bandwidth of the reference carrier 5 MHz [38]
go,b0 Annual leased line cost of the reference carrier 2000e [38]
gc,s Site buildout cost 2000e [38]
ξ O&M annual percentage 15% [41]
TABLE I: BS cost model parameters
As in [36] and [37], the revenues r˜ is incurred by MNO
i in coalition s are calculated according to a simple data
service pricing model, where the latter is defined in terms of
the average data rate perceived by users of s. Let ρnoms (us )
be the nominal rate coalition s can provide to its users by
activating us BSs. For a given level of Signal to Interference
and Noise Ratio (SINR) and a given system bandwidth, the
nominal user rate in LTE is the maximum rate perceived by a
single user when assigned all downlink LTE resource blocks
from its serving BS. The downlink SINR is a function of the
number of BSs activated by the coalition the user belongs to: a
larger number of BSs results in the user being on the average
closer to its serving BS, and therefore receiving a stronger
signal, but also closer to the interfering ones6. The average
rate ρs (us ) perceived by a user in coalition s can be defined
in terms of ρnoms (us ) and of the load of its serving BS:
ρs (us ) = ρnoms (us )(1 − η)
∑
i∈s σi N
us , ∀s ∈ S, (3)
where parameter η is the user activity factor representing the
probability that a user is actually active in his/her serving BS,∑
i∈s σiN is the total number of users of coalition s whereas
(
∑
i∈s σiN )/us gives the average number of users served by
one BS. To obtain ρs (us ), the nominal rate is then scaled down
by the factor (1 − η)(∑i∈s σiN )/us representing the average
congestion level at a serving BS.
Let δ denote the monthly price per user and per unit (Mbps)
of data service. As ρs (us ) represents the average user rate
provided by coalition s ∈ S when it activates us BSs 7, the
6When calculating the nominal user rate, any other BS transmission will
use at least a subset of the available resource blocks and therefore unavoidably
interfere.
7The simulation set up to obtain ρs (us ) as a function of us for each s ∈ S
is explained in details in Section V-A.
revenues r is each member MNO i ∈ s can incur when in s at
the end of the investment lifetime D, are then modeled linearly
in ρs (us ):
r is = δDσiN ρs (us ), ∀i ∈ s. (4)
Let u˜s be the number of BSs that maximizes the global return
on investment of coalition s calculated as:
u˜s = argmax
us ∈Z+
us ≤Umax
*,
∑
i∈s
δDσiN ρs (us ) − gsus+- , ∀s ∈ S, (5)
where Umax is the maximum number of small cell sites
coalition s can activate in the area.
Finally, the revenues r˜ is of MNO i from coalition s and the
total cost c˜s of coalition s are the following:
r˜ is = δDσiN ρs (u˜s ), ∀s ∈ S, ∀i ∈ s, (6)
c˜s = gs u˜s , ∀s ∈ S. (7)
IV. COOPERATIVE GAME MODELS
In this section we describe the two cooperative game theory
models we developed for the problem. The first one is a
Non Transferable Utility (NTU) game, namely we assume that
players share the network infrastructure cost, but each keeps
its own revenue (Section IV-A), while the second one is a
Transferable Utility (TU) game, namely, beside sharing the
cost, we allow players to partially transfer their revenue to
others (Section IV-B).
The NTU model represents indeed a more intuitive scenario
as MNOs incur revenues from their individual share of users.
However, we define the player payoffs in terms of their profits,
i.e., as revenues minus cost; therefore, if an MNO benefits
from being in a coalition, e.g., due its aggregated spectrum
resources, and has no incentive to leave the coalition, even
when giving away part of its revenue to the others, then this
is worth being investigated by means of the TU model. In
other words, the TU model allows to analyze at what extent
a coalition is valuable to the MNOs.8
For both games, we want to determine whether the grand
coalition is selected and, if so, how to make it stable. Thus, we
look for the elements of the core, namely the payoff allocations
which guarantee that there is no incentive neither for an MNO
to leave the grand coalition and build a network by itself nor
for any subset of MNOs to create their own coalition/shared
network. In other words, whenever the core is nonempty, the
grand coalition is preferred by all MNOs.
A. A Non Transferable Utility game model
We model the problem as a NTU cooperative game (O,V ),
where the set of players coincides with the set O of MNOs.
The set-valued mapping V assigns a set of feasible payoff
vectors V (s) to each coalition s ∈ S and is defined as follows:
V (s) =
(pi )i∈O :
∑
i∈s
pi ≤
∑
i∈s
r˜ is − c˜s , pi ≤ r˜ is , ∀ i ∈ s
 .
8See Section VI for numerical examples.
5The value of the payoffs pi is bounded by the inequalities
described above. Inequality
∑
i∈s pi ≤ ∑i∈s r˜ is − c˜s guarantees
that the sum of the payoffs of the players does not exceed
the overall payoff, which is given by the difference between
the sum of the revenues and the coalitional cost. Inequalities
pi ≤ r˜ is make sure that the revenues are not transferred
among players by limiting each player’s payoff to its respective
revenue.
We aim at determining whether the grand coalition is
selected by the players or not, and how they decide to share
the network cost among them. Thus, we study the core of the
game, namely the set of payoff vectors that make the grand
coalition preferable to any sub-coalition. To formally define
the core, the Pareto efficient frontier F of the set V (O) must
be defined as follows:
F =
(pi )i∈O :
∑
i∈O
pi =
∑
i∈O
r˜ iO − c˜O , pi ≤ r˜ iO , ∀ i ∈ O
 .
The core of the game is then defined as
C = F \
⋃
s∈S
int V (s),
where \ denotes the difference between two sets and int
denotes the interior of a set.
B. A transferable utility game model
If we assume that players may partially transfer their rev-
enue to others, then the corresponding model is a Transferable
Utility game (O,v), where O is the set of players and v is
the characteristic function, i.e., a real-valued function which
assigns to each coalition s ∈ S its overall payoff defined as
v(s) =
∑
i∈s
r˜ is − c˜s .
Notice that this TU game is equivalent to the NTU game
described in Section IV-A where the constraints pi ≤ r˜ is for
any i ∈ s are removed from the definition of V (s).
Similarly to the NTU model, we are interested in finding the
set of payoff vectors that make the grand coalition preferable
to any sub-coalition, that is the core of the TU game, which
is defined as
C =
(pi )i∈O :
∑
i∈O
pi = v(O),
∑
i∈s
pi ≥ v(s), ∀ s ⊂ O
 .
We remark that we have defined the characteristic function
v assuming the joint strategy space of coalition s is the number
of BSs it activates (0 ≤ us ≤ Umax ). Further, the utility of s
from activating us BSs is given by the corresponding global
return on investment,
∑
i∈s r is (us ) − cs (us ), where such utility
depends only on us and it is not affected by the actions of
i < s. Therefore, u˜s represents the strategy of coalition s
whereas v(s) =
∑
i∈s r˜ is − c˜s its overall payoff. Although the
overall payoff of a coalition is determined maximizing its total
return on investment, which does not necessarily maximize the
individual return on investment of each of its member MNOs,
when such payoff is distributed among them according to a
solution in the core, no MNO has an incentive to deviate.
C. A two MNOs example
Assume that there are only two MNOs, i.e., O = {A,B}.
For the NTU game (see Figure 1a), the set of feasible payoff
vectors corresponding to the grand coalition {A,B} is
VNTU ({A,B}) =

(pA,pB ):
pA + pB ≤ r˜A{A,B } + r˜B{A,B } − c˜{A,B }
pA ≤ r˜A{A,B }
pB ≤ r˜B{A,B }

.
The Pareto efficient frontier FNTU of the set VNTU ({A,B})
is the line segment with extreme points
ΠA =
(
r˜A{A,B }, r˜
B
{A,B } − c˜{A,B }
)
,
ΠB =
(
r˜A{A,B } − c˜{A,B }, r˜B{A,B }
)
,
where in ΠA the coalitional cost c˜{A,B } is entirely paid by
MNO B, while in ΠB it is entirely paid by A. Therefore, the
core CNTU (the bold segment in the figure) is obtained as the
difference between FNTU and the union of the interiors of the
two halfplanes representing the feasible payoffs for the single
player coalitions:
int V ({A}) = {(pA,pB) : pA < v({A})} ,
int V ({B}) = {(pA,pB) : pB < v({B})} ,
where v({A}) = r˜A{A} − c˜{A} and v({B}) = r˜B{B } − c˜{B }.
In fact, such halfplanes represents the sets of vectors of
payoff such that the single player would earn more alone than
joining the grand coalition. Therefore, we can write the core
CNTU as follows:
CNTU =

(pA,pB) :
pA + pB = r˜A{A,B } + r˜
B
{A,B } − c˜{A,B }
v({A}) ≤ pA ≤ r˜A{A,B }
v({B}) ≤ pB ≤ r˜B{A,B }

.
Instead, for the TU game (see Figure 1b), the set of feasible
payoff vector is the halfplane
VTU ({A,B}) =
{
(pA,pB): pA + pB ≤ r˜A{A,B } + r˜B{A,B } − c˜{A,B }
}
,
the Pareto efficient frontier is the line
FTU =
{
(pA,pB) : pA + pB = r˜A{A,B } + r˜
B
{A,B } − c˜{A,B }
}
,
and the core
CTU =
(pA,pB) :
pA + pB = r˜A{A,B } + r˜
B
{A,B } − c˜{A,B }
pA ≥ v({A})
pB ≥ v({B})
 .
Notice that the core of the NTU game is a subset of the TU
one. In the example depicted in Figure 1, the grand coalition
provides MNO B with a strictly positive margin with respect
to investing alone, even if it pays the entire c˜{A,B } cost, that
is, r˜B{A,B } − c˜{A,B } − v({B}) > 0. Therefore, it is still profitable
for B to be in the grand coalition even it transfers part of its
revenues to A (represented by payoff vectors in CTU \CNTU ).
The following relations between the parameter values de-
termine whether the core of each two players game is empty
or not:
6(a) NTU game (b) TU game
Fig. 1: A two-players example: Pareto frontier and core
1) If v({A,B}) < v({A}) + v({B}), that is,
c˜{A,B }− (c˜{A} + c˜{B }) > (r˜A{A,B } + r˜B{A,B })− (r˜A{A} + r˜B{B }) ,
then the core of both games is empty as both MNOs
are better off investing alone. Roughly speaking, if the
additional revenues generated from the grand coalition
do not cover its additional cost, than the grand coalition
is not stable.
2) Otherwise, if v({A,B}) ≥ (v{A}) + v({B}), then the
core of the TU game is nonempty. In particular, when
v({A,B}) = v({A})+v({B}), it consists of a single payoff
vector,
(
pA = v{A}, pB = v{B }
)
, which corresponds to the
case when MNOs are indifferent between cooperating or
not. As for the NTU game:
2a) If either v({A}) > r˜A{A,B } or v({B}) > r˜B{A,B }, then the
core of the NTU game is empty. Notice that v({A}) >
r˜AAB means MNO A is better off alone, even if B
could pay for the entire c˜{A,B } cost.
2b) Otherwise, if v({A}) ≤ r˜A{A,B } and v({B}) ≤ r˜B{A,B },
then also the core of the NTU game is nonempty.
V. COMPUTATIONAL TESTS
A. Simulation environment
As in [36] and [37], a simulation environment has been set
up in Matlab to obtain the average user rate ρs (us ) for each
coalition s as function of the number us of activated small cell
BSs varying from 1 to Umax. The us BSs and 10 sample users
are uniformly distributed in a pseudo-random fashion on the
considered square area. The downlink SINR for a reference
system bandwidth of a sample user of coalition s, when s
activates us BSs, is given by:
SINRs =
Pi
ls
*..,
∑
1≤ j≤us
j,i
Pj
+//- + Pnoise
, ∀s ∈ S, (8)
where Pi is the signal power the sample user receives from
its serving BS, whereas
∑
1≤ j≤us, j,i Pj is the power received
from interfering (non-serving) ones. The received signal power
is calculated according to the following three-parameter path
loss model (transmitted signal power Pt x , fixed path loss Cpl
and path loss exponent Γ), defined within the GreenTouch
Consortium [42]:
Pr x [dBm] = Pt x [dBm] − Cpl [dB] − 10Γlog(d[km]), (9)
where d is the sample user–BS distance. The captured in-
terference is then scaled down by the load of coalition s,
ls = 1− (1−η)
∑
i∈s
σi N
us , as users are characterized by an activity
factor η. Pnoise is the white gaussian noise power for the
reference system bandwidth.
The resulting SINR is then mapped to LTE spectral effi-
ciency according to a multilevel SINR–to–spectral efficiency
scheme [42]. Multiplying the obtained spectral efficiency by
the coalition aggregated bandwidth b˜s , we obtain the nominal
user rate ρnoms (us ). 100 simulation iterations are run for
each value of us so that an average value for ρnoms (us ) is
obtained across all sample users and iterations. Finally, ρs (us )
is obtained from ρnoms (us ) as defined in (3).
B. Instances
We consider instances with 3 MNOs 9, namely A, B and
C and a 4 km2 area populated by 20000 users. Umax is set to
10000, which is an arbitrarily large number of small cells for
the considered area size; however, the number of activated
small cells by any coalition does not exceed 1500 for all
the considered instances. Parameter δ, which represents the
monthly price per unit of service and per user, is set equal
to equidistant values obtained discretizing the range [0.5,3]
with a 0.01 step. We set up 5 scenarios (S1–S5) with different
mixtures of market shares and “spectrum shares"10 as shown
in Table II. The values of the bandwidth associated with the
spectrum license of each MNO bi , are set to standardized
9The considered number of MNOs is common for most countries, as far
as facility-based operators are concerned [43]. [25] and [34] also consider 3
MNOs. Nevertheless, the proposed approach can be easily extended to more
MNOs.
10The term “spectrum share" is used analogously with market share to
represent the weight of the spectrum of an MNO w.r.t. to the total obtained
aggregating the spectrum of all MNOs (bi/
∑
j∈O b j ).
7bandwidths for LTE/LTE-A ({1.4, 3, 5, 10, 15, 20} MHz)
[13]. In particular, scenarios S4 and S5 aim at representing
cases that may arise under traditional and recent design of
spectrum auctions. The extreme case in which only one MNO
in the area has succeeded to obtain a spectrum license from
the latest auction has been considered; we assume such MNO
is either the smallest MNO (S4), for instance, a new entrant
which has benefited from a set-aside spectrum policy11 [3], or
the incumbent (S5), which is the most likely to be the highest
bidder in a traditional auction.
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5
A B C A B C A B C A B C A B C
σi 1/3 1/3 1/3 1/3 1/3 1/3 0.1 0.3 0.6 0.1 0.3 0.6 0.1 0.3 0.6
bi 5 5 5 1.4 5 10 5 5 5 15 0 0 0 0 15
TABLE II: Scenarios
Parameters notation and their corresponding values are
summarized in Table III.
Symbol Description Value
O Set of MNOs {A,B,C}
S Set of nonempty coalitions 2O \ ∅
N Total number of users in the area 20000
A Area size 4 km2
Umax Max. number of BSs in the area 10000
δ Monthly price of 1 Mbps [0.5,3] e/Mbps
D Investment lifetime 120 months [45]
η User activity factor 0.01
TABLE III: Sets, parameters and corresponding values
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS ANALYSIS
In this section we discuss the results obtained applying first
the NTU game model and then the TU game model. Our
goal is to highlight the impact of the three main parameters
of the problem, namely δ, market share and spectrum share,
on the existence of the core and on its features and on the
nucleolus. The nucleolus is a well known solution of NTU
and TU games (see, e.g., [46,47]). We use the nucleolus as a
suggested solution, as it always belongs to the core, if the core
is nonempty, and therefore represents a stable way of assigning
payoffs to players. Roughly speaking, the nucleolus minimizes
the largest dissatisfaction of the coalitions, thus reducing the
inequity among the coalitions, where the dissatisfaction is
related to the difference between the coalition value and what
its members receive according to the nucleolus.
Across all considered scenarios, when δ ∈ [0.5,0.53],
neither the grand coalition nor subcoalitions find it profitable
to invest, thus the core is trivial as it collapses to only one
point corresponding to zero investment and thus zero revenues.
11Despite some countries regulator efforts to encourage competition in
mobile networks, by introducing spectrum set-asides during auctions and
relaxing their coverage requirements, new entrants do not always succeed
in deploying a network which may lead to inefficient spectrum allocations or
eventually with the set-aside spectrum ending up in the hands of incumbent
MNOs [44].
Instead, for δ ∈ [0.58,3], the core of both games is nonempty
(see Table IV).
Therefore in Sections VI-A and VI-B, we focus our analysis
on instances with a nonempty core. For such instances, as
payoff allocations in the core make the grand coalition prefer-
able to any subcoalition, only the grand coalition is analyzed.
Instead, for the few particular instances with an empty core,
we investigate subcoalitions (Section VI-C).
In Section VI-D, we assess the MNOs’ gain from sharing
with respect to building individual networks.
Figures 2 and 3 report the core of the NTU and the TU
game, respectively, for δ ∈{0.75, 1.5, 3} for each considered
scenario (S1-S5).
As we are interested in how the players share the network
infrastructure cost, we introduce three values αA,αB and αC
which represent the fraction of the overall cost paid by player
A, B and C, respectively. The payoff of a player i in the grand
coalition O can be therefore written as
pi = r˜ iO − αi c˜iO .
The core is represented in the (αA,αB) plane, as αC = 1 −
αA − αB .
As for the NTU game, in each sub-figure of Figure 2 the
Pareto efficient frontier F is represented by the triangle with
vertices (0,0)(0,1)(1,0), where the diagonal line connecting
(0,1) and (1,0) represents the payoff values such that αC = 0.
The light grey areas represent the sets V (s) for all the sub-
coalitions. The core is thus represented by the dark grey area.
Beside the core, the nucleolus is reported with a white circle
and the market share with a black triangle.
As for the TU game, in each sub-figure of Figure 3 the
core is represented by the dark grey area, while dashed lines
represent lines αA = 0, αB = 0 and αC = 0. The color and
symbolic code of Figure 3 are the same as the one of Figure 2.
A. NTU game results
1) Impact of δ: For all the considered scenarios, the core
size enlarges with the increasing value of δ, namely the range
of the acceptable values of αA, αB and αC increases. Let us
consider for instance scenario S1 (Figure 2a): for δ = 0.75, αA
ranges from about 0.25 to about 0.42, while for δ = 3 it may
rise up to about 0.8. Roughly speaking, with the increasing
value of δ and therefore the increasing revenues, players accept
more ways of dividing the costs and accept to bear a higher
fraction of costs. Further, they may also accept to free one of
the players of its fraction of costs. In scenario S1 each player
can be freed from the network cost, as αA,αB and αC can
all be equal to 0 for δ = 3, due to the symmetry of the core.
However, only one player at a time can be freed from the
cost, the other two agreeing to share the overall amount. In
fact, in scenario S1 the market shares as well as the spectrum
shares are equal: this results in a symmetric core and makes
the market share coincide with the nucleolus. Market share
and spectrum share have an impact of the shape of the core,
as it will be discussed in the following paragraphs.
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Fig. 2: NTU game results: core, nucleolus and market shares
2) Impact of the spectrum share: To highlight the impact
of the spectrum share let us compare scenarios S1 (Figure 2a),
where all the players have the same market and spectrum
share, and S2 (Figure 2b), where all the players have the
same market share, but different spectrum shares (1.4:5:10
MHz, respectively). For scenario S2 the core is not symmet-
ric, differently from scenario S1. The acceptable fraction is
somehow inversely dependent from the spectrum share: the
highest the spectrum share the smallest the minimum fraction
allowed. Thus, for δ ≥ 1.5, αC can be equal to 0, as A and
B are willing to share the overall cost in order to exploit the
spectrum provided by C. For the highest value of δ, αA can
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Fig. 3: TU game results: core, nucleolus and market shares
reach 0.95, while αB is at most 0.8. The market share belongs
to the core but it never coincides with the nucleolus, which
gets closer to the line representing αC = 0 as δ increases.
3) Impact of the market share: To highlight the impact of
the market shares, let us compare scenarios S1 (Figure 2a),
where all the players have the same market share, and S3
(Figure 2c), where all the players have the same spectrum
share, but different market shares (0.1:0.3:0.6, respectively). In
scenario S3 the core is not symmetric, although as for scenario
S1 it enlarges with the increasing values of δ. The range of
acceptable values of αB is greater than the range of acceptable
9values of αA. It is somehow proportional to the market share:
in fact B has three times the users of A and for δ = 3 αA ∈
[0,0.25] while αB ∈ [0,0.75]. Player C, which has the highest
number of users, may accept to pay the overall BSs cost so as
to profit of the other two’s spectrum: in fact the point αA =
αB = 0 is in the core. Although the market share is in the core,
it does not coincide with the nucleolus, not even for δ = 0.75.
For higher values of δ the nucleolus suggests to keep αA and
αB smaller than the corresponding market shares, and to have
αA almost equal to 0.
4) Combined effect of market and spectrum share: The
combined effect of market and spectrum shares is shown in
Figures 2d and 2e, reporting the core for scenarios S4 and
S5, respecively. In scenario S4 the player with the minimum
number of users is the only one owning a spectrum, while in
scenario S5 the incumbent player is the only one owning a
spectrum. The core of scenario S4 is very small and is not
very sensitive to the value of δ. The acceptable values of αA
are very small, never above 0.15 and αA = 0 is acceptable. For
δ = 3, αB cannot rise above 0.5: this means that the incumbent
C should pay most of the cost with a little help from B so
as they can both profit from the spectrum of A. Instead, in
scenario S5, where the incumbent is the one providing the
spectrum, αA and αB cannot be equal to 0. For smaller values
of δ, neither αC can be equal to 0, as A and B do not find
it profitable to cover for the whole expenses due to limited
revenues. Instead, for δ = 3, αC can be null, showing that A
and B find it profitable to cover the whole expenses in order
to profit of the spectrum of C.
B. TU game results
Many remarks can be extended to the TU case whose
results are reported in Figure 3: for instance, the effect of
δ is similar as for the NTU case, as the core enlarges with
the increasing value of δ. However, as revenues are assumed
to be transferable, the value of α can also be negative,
meaning that not only the player does not share the cost but
it also receives part of the revenues of the other players. This
of course depends on the spectrum and market shares. For
scenario S1 with δ = 3, all the players can receive from
others, although not simultaneously. Instead, in scenario S2
only players B and C, that provide most of the spectrum, can
receive revenues from the others, although not simultaneously:
they are rewarded for providing spectrum by receiving more
than their own revenue. In scenario S3 with δ ≥ 1.5, the
players with the smallest number of users can be rewarded:
for δ = 3 they can both and simultaneously receive utility
from the incumbent C, which finds it profitable to give part of
its revenues despite having to bear the whole expenses, as the
increased available spectrum provides it with higher revenues.
In scenarios S4 and S5 the only player providing the spectrum,
A in S4 and C in S5, can be rewarded for high values of δ.
This is more accentuated in S4 where A not only provides the
overall spectrum but has also the smallest market share.
C. Subcoalition analysis
Table IV reports the stable coalitions for different ranges of
the value of δ for all scenarios. When δ ≤ 0.53, no coalition
finds it profitable to invest (denoted by the symbol −), whereas
for δ ≥ 0.58 the core of the grand coalition is nonempty for
all scenarios. Instead for instances with an empty core, stable
subcoalitions are reported 12.
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5
δ ∈ [0.5, 0.53] − − − − −
δ = 0.54 − − − {A,C } {C }
δ = 0.55 − {B,C } − {A,C } {B,C }
δ = 0.56 {A, B,C } {A, B,C } {A, B,C } {A,C } {B,C }
δ = 0.57 {A, B,C } {A, B,C } {A, B,C } {A, B,C } {B,C }
δ ∈ [0.58, 3] {A, B,C } {A, B,C } {A, B,C } {A, B,C } {A, B,C }
TABLE IV: Stable coalitions for each scenario and value of δ
We explore scenarios S4 and S5 when δ=0.55, for which we
study the core of each subcoalition of 2 MNOs (i.e., {A,B},
{A,C} and {B,C})13. We recall that in scenario S4 only A has
a spectrum license whereas in S5, only C. In case it is feasible
for a coalition to invest (i.e., at least one of its members has a
spectrum license), Table V reports whether the core is empty,
otherwise, if nonempty, it indicates the range of stable cost
fractions (αi) and obtainable payoffs (pi) by each member
MNO i.
In scenario S4, the core of the grand coalition is empty
since v({A,B,C}) < v({A,C}), i.e., A and C can be both
better off in {A,C}. However, both {A,B} and {A,C} have a
nonempty core. Since B and C cannot invest neither alone nor
together, due to the lack of spectrum, both prefer collaborating
with A. Instead, A prefers {A,C} to {A,B}: if C were to pay
at least 86.26% of the cost of {A,C} (which lies inside C’s
stable range of cost fractions and thus it is profitable (see
Table V)), the payoff of A from {A,C}, would be at least
as large as the maximum payoff it can secure from {A,B}
(123153 e), that is, if B were to pay for all the {A,B} cost.
Consequently, {A,C} will be created whereas B will not invest
at all. Such behavior is due to the very low value of δ (i.e.,
price per unit of service), which limits revenues and in turn
the level of investment (i.e., number of activated BS) in order
to be profitable. But since {A,B,C} is more congested than
{A,B} and {A,C} (no spectrum pooling gain since B and C
do not contribute with spectrum) and requires more investment
to lower the level of congestion, it is then less profitable. In
turn, A can better exploit its spectrum by collaborating with
C instead of B, since C has the largest market share and thus
can take up a larger fraction of their shared network cost.
For S5, the core is empty since the overall payoff of the
grand coalition (v({A,B,C})) is strictly smaller than the overall
payoff of any other subcoalition for which it is profitable to
invest. In other words, C is better off in any other subcoalition
it can be part of than in {A,B,C}. Further, also {A,C} has an
empty core since v({A,C}) < v({C}), that is, C is better off
by itself than collaborating with A, as A can only cover a
small portion of the {A,C} cost, given its small market share.
12Notice that for all entries of the table in which the stable coalition consist
of either one or two MNOs, the remaining MNOs do not invest at all.
13Similar observations can be drawn also for the other instances for which
the grand coalition is not stable.
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Instead, {B,C} has a nonempty core, thus B and C will build
a shared network while A will not invest at all. Although C
could be building its own network (v({C}) > 0), it prefers
collaborating with B which can pay up to 1/3 of their shared
network cost.
It can be observed that, in conditions of very low revenues,
and in particular when there is no spectrum pooling gain,
smaller coalitions and cooperation with bigger MNOs are
preferred.
S4
{A, B } αA: [23.76, 25.41]% pA: [0, 123153]e
αB: [74.59, 76.24]% pB: [0, 123153]e
{A,C } αA: [12.46, 14.59]% pA: [0, 307490]e
αC: [85.41, 87.54]% pC: [0, 307490]e
{B,C } no spectrum license
S5
{A, B } no spectrum license
{A,C } empty core (v({A,C})>0)
{B,C } αB: [34.12, 34.13]% pB: [0, 1352]e
αC: [65.87, 65.88]% pC: [344749, 346101]e
TABLE V: Core of subcoalitions for δ = 0.55 (same for the
NTU and the TU games)
D. Sharing gain
Tables VI and VII summarize the gain of each MNO from
joining the grand coalition relative to not sharing, that is,
if they were to build individual networks. The values are
calculated as pi−pipi 100%, ∀i ∈ O, where pi is the payoff of
MNO i from the grand coalition according to the Nucleolus
solution whereas pi is its payoff when investing by itself.
Notice that when it is either not profitable for an MNO to
build its own network (i.e., its revenues do not cover its cost:
e.g. MNO A for δ = 0.75) or not feasible (the MNO has no
spectrum license: e.g. MNOs B and C in S4 or A and C in
S5), then pi = 0. Such cases are represented by the ∞ symbol
(the absolute gain is nevertheless finite).
As we calculate the sharing gain for the Nucleolus solution,
which, by definition, tends to select a “fair” solution from the
core, the NTU and TU models provide similar gains across
all considered scenarios and cases 14.
While the increase of δ increases the number of stable divi-
sions of the grand coalition cost among the MNOs (illustrated
by the increase of core size in Figures 2 and 3), Tables VI
and VII indicate decreasing values of the relative gain as δ
increases for all scenarios but S5. This shows how sharing
is more beneficial when low revenues significantly limit the
level of investment in network infrastructure an MNO can
undertake by itself. Nevertheless, sharing remains profitable
14For scenario S4, δ = 3, which represents an extreme case, the nucleolus
solutions of the two games are however significantly different: the relative gain
of MNO A under the TU model is one order of magnitude larger compared
to the NTU one. Such behavior was also reflected in the core size being
significantly larger in case of the TU game w.r.t. to the NTU one (Figures 2
and 3).
even for higher values of δ, as MNOs still benefit from a
larger pool of spectrum resources and cost sharing.
As expected, identical MNOs obtain equal gains (scenario
S1). Scenario S2 shows the benefit of spectrum pooling: the
smaller the MNO spectrum share, the more it benefits from the
grand coalition, despite having to pay for a larger fraction of
its infrastructure cost. Instead, scenario S3 shows how MNOs
with smaller market shares, which find it more difficult to
face the network upfront cost by themselves, incur larger
gains from cooperation. In particular, for scenarios S4 and
S5, since there is no spectrum pooling gain (only one MNO
has a spectrum license), the relative gain is much smaller
compared the other scenarios, especially for MNO C (scenario
S5), which has less difficulties covering its network cost given
its large market share (as opposed to A in scenario S4, that,
despite owning a spectrum license, has limited revenues given
its small share of users). Contrarily to the other scenarios, in
S5, sharing becomes more beneficial for C as δ increases, as
A and B can afford to cover a larger fraction of the grand
coalition cost.
A B C
S1
δ = 0.75 2052.67% 2052.67% 2052.67%
δ = 1.5 290.99% 290.99% 290.99%
δ = 3 254.94% 254.94% 254.94%
S2
δ = 0.75 ∞ 2179.71% 206.64%
δ = 1.5 9374.79% 317.69% 151.37%
δ = 3 1459.48% 275.62% 146.01%
S3
δ = 0.75 61995.21% 1998.13% 901.87%
δ = 1.5 833.41% 329.98% 216.03%
δ = 3 433.20% 298.55% 205.77%
S4
δ = 0.75 431.54% ∞ ∞
δ = 1.5 109.35% ∞ ∞
δ = 3 50.82% ∞ ∞
S5
δ = 0.75 ∞ ∞ 23.22%
δ = 1.5 ∞ ∞ 26.74%
δ = 3 ∞ ∞ 32.58%
TABLE VI: NTU game: sharing gain
A B C
S1
δ = 0.75 2052.67% 2052.67% 2052.67%
δ = 1.5 290.99% 290.99% 290.99%
δ = 3 254.94% 254.94% 254.94%
S2
δ = 0.75 ∞ 2176.61% 207.15%
δ = 1.5 9378.69% 342.27% 141.57%
δ = 3 1428.44% 262.00% 154.14%
S3
δ = 0.75 61817.36% 2010.21% 899.36%
δ = 1.5 918.79% 314.99% 210.30%
δ = 3 703.23% 265.31% 177.26%
S4
δ = 0.75 448.76% ∞ ∞
δ = 1.5 456.01% ∞ ∞
δ = 3 574.99% ∞ ∞
S5
δ = 0.75 ∞ ∞ 23.10%
δ = 1.5 ∞ ∞ 39.06%
δ = 3 ∞ ∞ 38.45%
TABLE VII: TU game: sharing gain
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VII. DISCUSSION
This work has targeted sharing of 4G small cells and
proposed a particular pricing and cost model. However, the
proposed game models are useful tools to study other technolo-
gies as well (e.g., 3G/4G macro cells) and/or different pricing
and cost models. In the following, we discuss the impact of
some of the assumptions made and the applicability of the
models to alternative settings.
• As investment in network infrastructure and spectrum
availability are both key to improving the service level
(i.e, data rate here), the proposed pricing model aims at
translating the two into revenues. Since nowdays MNOs
struggle with monetizing their investments (either in
infrastructure of spectrum licenses), roughly speaking, the
considered revenues would represent an overestimation.
Nevertheless, by considering a wide range of such rev-
enues, we were able to see their impact on the stable
coalitions and their corresponding cost divisions. We also
note that it is outside the scope of this work to investigate
pricing models in line with those in the market, such
as bundles of different types of services and data usage
caps. In these lines, as the churn rate is determined by
marketing strategies rather than technical factors, we do
not address the user migration among MNOs.
• The considered cost model accounts for the main upfront
and operational cost terms related to the radio equipments
and for the backhauling cost. Although a more realistic
backhauling cost model could be used instead, our goal
was to overestimate its cost, in order to have a more
significant sharing tradeoff, that is, between benefiting
from larger spectrum resources when in a larger coalition
but incurring a higher cost to which amounts also a higher
level of congestion. The backhaul optimization is also
outside the scope of this work.
• We do not account for the spectrum license cost since
we assume MNOs have purchased the spectrum license
individually and prior to entering a sharing agreement.
The amount of spectrum available to a coalition depends
then on its members contribution, and thus is not part of
its strategy, unlike the investment in network infrastruc-
ture. The models can nevertheless take into account such
cost as follows: Let cˆi be the spectrum license cost of
MNO i ∈ O, representing an upfront cost. It is then only
profitable for an MNO to be in the grand coalition if its
allocated payoff can cover cˆi , that is, pi ≥ cˆi ,∀i ∈ O.
Such constraint translates into an upper bound on the
fraction of cost the MNO would be willing to pay to
be in the grand coalition:
pi ≥ cˆi =⇒ r˜ iO−αiO c˜O ≥ cˆi =⇒ αiO ≤
r˜ iO − cˆi
c˜O
,∀i ∈ O.
If
(
r˜ iO − cˆi
)
/c˜O < 1, the constraints would reduce the
set of feasible payoffs of the proposed models. Further, if∑
i∈O
(
r˜ iO − cˆi
)
/c˜O < 1, then the grand coalition would
not be created. If the core was empty, the constraints
would similarly be extended to subcoalitions.
We did not carry out such analysis since a spectrum li-
cense cost depends on several factors such as the spectrum
auction time and place and the spectrum band. However,
assuming the spectrum license cost is proportional to its
amount of spectrum, the larger the spectrum provided by
an MNO, the smaller the cost fraction it would pay to
be in a coalition. This behavior is indirectly observed
even without explicitly taking into account the spectrum
license cost, as MNOs contributing with a larger spectrum
share tend to pay less than the others.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
This work investigates the problem of RAN and spectrum
sharing in 4G networks for a scenario in which MNOs with
fixed market and spectrum shares plan to upgrade their existing
RAN by deploying small cell BSs. Each MNO weighs between
deploying an individual network or enter a sharing agreement
with other MNOs and thus build a shared network. We assume
that when MNOs build a shared network, they will aggregate
their spectrum resources. A generic mobile data pricing model
is introduced to determine revenues incurred by an MNO from
each possible coalition (sharing agreement). We propose two
cooperative game models to address the problem: if MNOs in
a coalition agree to share its cost but keep their individual
revenues, the problem is formalized as a non-transferable
utility cooperative game; if MNOs would be willing to give
away also part of their individual revenues to be in a coalition,
a transferable utility game is proposed instead. The core and
nucleolus solution concepts are leveraged to determine stable
cost divisions.
The proposed models are investigated for several instances
with different network and economic settings aiming to repre-
sent realistic scenarios. For the vast majority of the considered
instances, MNOs are better off building a unique shared RAN
than creating sub-coalitions or building individual RANs due
to the combined gain from spectrum aggregation and cost
reduction from sharing the network infrastructure. The cost
division of the shared network infrastructure that guarantees
stability depends both on network and economic inputs: MNOs
with a larger customer base should be accounted for a larger
fraction of the cost; instead, MNOs contributing with a larger
spectrum portion are “rewarded” by a lower cost fraction. In
particular, MNOs which provide the largest spectrum portion
are not only exempted from the network infrastructure cost but
can also receive part of the other MNOs revenues. Dividing
the cost based on the market share does not always guarantee
stability whereas the stable cost division selected by the
nucleolus, which in turn accounts also for the MNOs spectrum
contribute, makes a better candidate for a cost division policy.
The models we propose here are generic instruments for
addressing the problem of network sharing from a strategic
perspective as they can accommodate for alternative technolo-
gies and/or pricing models and cost functions.
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